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Showing posts with label economic crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic crisis. Show all posts
March 27, 2012
"Sustainable Prosperity: A Greek Perspective II" by Michalis Theodoropoulos
In Worldwatch Institute Europe’s second article examining the current situation in Greece we explore the particularities behind the current social situation, the ongoing changes taking place within Greek society and the notion of sustainable prosperity as viewed from a Greek standpoint.
Worldwatch researcher Eirini Glyki [ http://www.worldwatch-europe.org/node/52 ] interviews Michalis Theodoropoulos [ http://www.linkedin.com/in/michalistheodoropoulos ], European Parliament assistant for the Greek Green Ecologists and responsible for environmental, food safety and health issues:
What was Greece’s relation to sustainable prosperity in the past? What is this relation in the present?
We need to define sustainable prosperity first. Do we mean in terms of GDP and consumption increase, or in terms of the Human Development Index and social welfare? Or merely the idea that the past was more prosperous than the present?
Greece following the tragic aftermath of World War II and the succeeding civil war went through a restructuring process under the sponsorship of the USA and the funds of the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP). These funds were used to build necessary infrastructure and supposedly boost production and consumption of goods.
Political instability until the late 1970’s, lack of planning and large internal migration from rural areas to city centers, rendered production patterns fragmented and unsustainable, while consumption was kept on basic needs. Big industry was never really developed; exports were never that important; agricultural production covered mainly internal needs but sufficiently. Society was still living in conservation status, saving rather than spending, secured by family bonds and trust in social institutions rather than in state welfare and the corrupted political system that followed. People worked hard but lived a rather descent and modest life, rich in spirit rather than material goods, small was still beautiful. The environment was kept in quite pristine condition, although there was a total absence of environmental protection.
Then the 1980’s came, along with EU subsidies and private bank loans, living conditions and the socio-economic fabric changed. Tourism became the main industry and subsidized agricultural production gave rise to monoculture of environmental stressful products. Small industrial units operated uncontrolled without any environmental consideration and there was a considerable shift from production of goods to service provision. A new middle class started to emerge, with an urge to spend more than it earns, to consume more than it needs.
During the 1990’s and till 2005, GDP increased along with stock market and property loan bubbles, people seemed to be happy to be able to consume more with easier loans, while at the same time refrained from their financial obligations to the state, as there was no payback in terms of public welfare. Prosperity seemed to be a benefit for many and living conditions improved, although the rich were getting richer and the poor were getting poorer. Bigger, easy and more was the beauty of the time.
Under the current crisis and austerity policies, prosperity really seems a thing of the past, as wages, pensions and social welfare are diminishing. A whole generation that invested in this lifestyle saw its aspirations and jobs getting evaporated. Although according to OECD, the Greek workforce is amongst the hardest working in the EU (although not that productive in GDP terms), austerity is affecting mostly the working and lower classes: unemployment is reaching 20%; the same percentage of the population at present lives in breadline conditions and new-homeless people pack in city centers by thousands.
Has the economic crisis triggered a change of views amongst Greek people?
Although there is widespread criticism against the political establishment and significant social turmoil, the majority of the Greek people are still entrapped in a certain lifestyle and political system, numb and afraid, waiting for help from above (politicians, the state, God, etc), or an easy way out.
Fortunately, there is a worth-noticing critical mass of people and movements striving for change, although in tight oppression and significantly fewer in numbers. Despite that, hundreds of thousands of people protest in massive demonstrations against the austerity policies and the colonial-type loans, while at the same time many thousands of people are creating their own post-crisis environment, smaller self-managed systems within the system, cracks in the existing monetary-based economy.
In the present, what are the attitudes of Greek people concerning their living model?
There is widespread consideration about the deterioration of living conditions in Greece at present, great anxiety and uncertainty about the future. Environmental considerations fall short when there is no guaranteed income and when there will be a privatization of public natural resources and services, in order to repay the usurious loans Greece received as bail-out.
Although the majority of the people are entrapped in city centers and certain lifestyles, a critical mass of the crisis generation has found ways to make cracks in space and time, either in the city, or in view of a reoccupation of the countryside. Sooner or later, people will have to start considering living with less but in better conditions, if not by choice, by need for sure. Bankruptcy is around the corner and people start considering life after money and debt.
Is, in your opinion, Greek society ready to move away from consumerism?
Consumerism in Greek society does not go back more than two generations. People will have to re-evaluate their financial and social institutions when the crisis really hits the bottom. Sustainable practices from the past, such as barter economy, solidarity networks, mutual assistance, community orchards, cooperatives, collective housing, reoccupation of public spaces and many more, have already shown signs of hope.
The younger generations, although entrapped in widespread commercialized consumerism, are ready and willing to revitalize traditional practices and consumption patterns followed by their grandparents. Following the inspiring example of Catalonia [ http://www.homenatgeacatalunyaii.org/en ], several self organized initiatives have sprung lately also in Greece, setting aside intermediaries, creating subsystems of their own, reclaiming public life and space.
Currently, what - if any - are the movements within Greek society shaping up to be?
Beyond the crisis there is a growing number of people that have decided to take their future in their hands and reinvent the collective We. You may move faster when you are alone, but you can go further if you collaborate. Local exchange trading systems without money, eco-communities, cooperatives of producers and consumers, worker cooperatives, urban community orchards, traditional seed banks and seed exchanges, collective management of public goods, public assemblies and self-organised social centers, are just few of hundreds of grassroots initiates that have sprung during the last two years in Greece. An indicative list can be found here. [ http://www.iliosporoi.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=514:2012-01-12-14-51-13&catid=84:2011-11-24-20-29-10&Itemid=374 ]
What are, in your opinion, the changes needed to be made in order for
Greek society to be viable?
Greek society needs a shift in its collective consciousness. As we exit the century of Self, we need to reinvent the new collective We, as much as, we need to redefine basic humanistic values and fundamental rights. We need a change of paradigm, a change of narrative, a change in our collective imaginary institution of society, in order to live our utopias, in order for the younger generation to see some light at the end of the tunnel.
We live in a period of historical developments, the end of an era and the beginning of another one. We need to find sustainable ways for the ecological transformation of society and the economy. We need to aspire confidence and optimism for the future. It is our duty not only to create the conditions for this transition but also to toll the whole society along this way, by promoting best practice examples and realistic but at the same time radical solutions.
Now many say that a new Marshall Plan is needed, a Green New Deal, focused on green investments and the ecological transformation of the industry. This is much needed, as much as we also need a shift towards degrowth targets, especially for certain industry sectors, such as energy, transport, automobile, chemicals, agriculture, while at the same time re-localize production and consumption. It is certain we need to start thinking of prosperity being decoupled from growth as determined by the current form of capitalism.
Greece specifically, could find solutions in dramatically cutting down military expenditure, taxing the Church’s wealth, as well as taxing the wealth of the richest 1-2% of the population and the financial stock exchange transactions. Moreover, at a larger scale, the “free -corporate- market” and banking system (including rating agencies) need to be regulated, in order to serve public interest instead of just being profit driven.
In your view, what does this crisis point out considering the existing living model and economic system? What are the connections of this crisis to sustainable prosperity?
It is my view that this current crisis, is a systemic restructuring of the current monetary-based economic system, purely profit driven, resulting to the economic elite accumulating further wealth and power. This clearly shows the default of the existing “neoliberal” policies, as well as of the current development patterns. The current economic system seems to have lost its morality by ignoring the human factor.
Unsustainable recipes of the past, as practiced in Greece, focusing on economic growth, GDP increase, over-consumption of natural resources, even at the expense of human lives, should be an example to avoid in the future as we strive to make a transition into societies with prosperity for all. In order to achieve sustainable prosperity, the current production model based on productivism and monetary-based economy should be replaced by a resource-based economy, a combination of green investment aiming at the ecological transformation of the economy and society, coupled by degrowth elements (live a better life with less material goods and fewer working hours) and a conscious lifestyle by everyone.
January 30, 2012
Witness: Children of the Riots. (Words, Images & Moments from the streets of Athens)
As the financial crisis weighs heavily on Greece,
the country seems trapped in a dead end.
the country seems trapped in a dead end.
But discontent over the misuse of power has
long been simmering.
long been simmering.
Greek youths reflect on how the killing
of a teenager by police and the global spreading
of economic, political and social crisis changed
their lives for ever.
of a teenager by police and the global spreading
of economic, political and social crisis changed
their lives for ever.
This is a short documentary about
children of the streets, children from
children of the streets, children from
the streets of Athens,
same children like these children in the streets
of Egypt, Tunisia, Barcelona,
New York or Oakland...
same children like these children in the streets
of Egypt, Tunisia, Barcelona,
New York or Oakland...
Same dreams, same desires, same rage...
These are short fragments from the History of 21st century
Film directed by Christos Georgiou for AlZajeera
December 7, 2011
"Social Mobility (in U.S.A.)? No, there is not!", by UnderstandingSociety
We often think of the United States as a place with a lot of social mobility. What exactly does this mean? And is it true? Ironically, the answer appears to be a fairly decisive "no." In fact, here's a graph from a 2005 New York Times series on income mobility that shows that the United States ranks second to last among Great Britain, US, France, Canada, and Denmark when it comes to the rate of income improvement over four generations for poor families. And here are two very interesting recent studies that come to similar conclusions -- a report on social mobility by the Center for American Progress and a 2007 academic study by researchers at Kent State, Wisconsin and Syracuse. Here is how Professor Kathryn Wilson, associate professor of economics at Kent State University, summarizes the main finding of the latter study: “People like to think of America as the land of opportunities. The irony is that our country actually has less social mobility and more inequality than most developed countries” (link).
Basically social mobility refers to the likelihood that a child will grow up into adulthood and attain a higher level of economic and social wellbeing than his/her family of origin. Is there a correlation between the socioeconomic status (SES) of an adult and his/her family of origin? Do poor people tend to have poor parents? And do poor parents tend to have children who end up as poor adults later in life? Does low SES in the parents' circumstances at a certain time in life -- say, the age of 30 -- serve to predict the SES of the child at the same age?
The fact of social mobility is closely tied to facts about social inequality and facts about social class. In a highly egalitarian society there would be little need for social mobility. And in a society with a fairly persistent class structure there is also relatively little social mobility -- because there is some set of mechanisms that limit entry and exit into the various classes. In the simplest terms, a social class is a sub-population within a society in which parents and their adult children tend to share similar occupations and economic circumstances of life. It is possible for a society to have substantial inequalities but also a substantial degree of social mobility. But there are good sociological reasons to suspect that this is a fairly unstable situation; groups with a significant degree of wealth and power are also likely to be in a position to arrange social institutions in such a way that privilege is transmitted across generations. (Here are several earlier postings on class; post, post, post.)
A crucial question to pose as we think about class and social mobility, is the issue of the social mechanisms through which children are launched into careers and economic positions in society. A pure meritocracy is a society in which specific social mechanisms distinguish between high-achieving and low-achieving individuals, assigning high-achieving individuals to desirable positions in society. A pure plutocracy is a society in which holders of wealth provide advantages to their children, ensuring that their adult children become the wealth-holders of the next generation. A caste system assigns children and young adults to occupations based on their ascriptive status. In each case there are fairly visible social mechanisms through which children from specific social environments are tracked into specific groups of roles in society. The sociological question is how these mechanisms work; in other words, we want to know about the "microfoundations" of the system of economic and social placement across generations.
In a society in which there is substantial equality of opportunity across all social groups, we would expect there to be little or no correlation between the SES of the parent and the child. We might have a very simple theory of the factors that determine an adult's SES in a society with extensive equality of opportunity: the sum total of the individual's talents, personality traits, and motivation strongly influence success in the pursuit of a career. (Chance also plays a role.) If talent is randomly distributed across the population, rich and poor; if all children are exposed to similar opportunities for the development of their talents; and if all walks of life are open to talent without regard to social status -- then we should find a zero correlation between parents' SES and adult child's SES. So, in this simple model, evidence of correlation with SES of parent and child would also be evidence of failures of equality of opportunity.
However, the situation is more complicated. Success in career is probably influenced by factors other than talent: for example, personal values, practical interests, personality qualities like perseverence, and cultural values. And these qualities are plainly influenced by the child's family and neighborhood environment. So if there is such a thing as a "culture of poverty" or a "culture of entrepreneurism", then the social fact of the child's immersion in this culture will be part of the explanation of the child's performance in adulthood -- whatever opportunities were available to the child. (French sociologist Didier Lapeyronnie makes a point along these lines about the segregation of immigrant communities that exists in French society today; post, post.) So this is a fact about family background that is causally relevant to eventual SES and independent of the opportunity structure of the society.
But another relevant fact is the sharply differentiated opportunities that exist for children and young adults from various social groups in many societies, including the United States. How is schooling provided to children across all income groups? What kind and quality of healthcare is available across income and race? To what extent are job opportunities made available to all individuals without regard to status, race, or income? How are urban people treated relative to suburban or rural people when it comes to the availability of important social opportunities? It is plain that there are substantial differences across many societies when it comes to questions like these.
Education is certainly one of the chief mechanisms of social mobility in any society; it involves providing the child and young adult with the tools necessary to translate personal qualities and talents into productive activity. So inequalities in access to education constitute a central barrier to social mobility. (See this earlier post for a discussion of some efforts to assess the impact of higher education on social mobility for disadvantaged people.)
And it seems all too clear that children have very unequal educational opportunities throughout the United States, from pre-school to university. These inequalities correlate with socially significant facts like family income, place of residence, and race; and they correlate in turn with the career paths and eventual SES of the young people who are placed in one or another of these educational settings. Race is a particularly prevalent form of structural inequalities of opportunity in the US; multiple studies have shown how slowly patterns of racial segregation are changing in the cities of the United States (post). And along with segregation comes limitation on opportunities associated with health, education, and employment.
So the findings mentioned above, documenting the relatively limited degree of social mobility that currently exists in the United States by international standards, are understandable when we consider the entrenched structures that exist in our country determining the opportunities available to children and young adults. Race, poverty, and geography conspire to create recurring patterns of low SES across generations of families in the United States. (See an earlier post on Douglas Massey's analysis of the mechanisms of race and inequality in the US.) And limited social mobility is the predictable result.
Basically social mobility refers to the likelihood that a child will grow up into adulthood and attain a higher level of economic and social wellbeing than his/her family of origin. Is there a correlation between the socioeconomic status (SES) of an adult and his/her family of origin? Do poor people tend to have poor parents? And do poor parents tend to have children who end up as poor adults later in life? Does low SES in the parents' circumstances at a certain time in life -- say, the age of 30 -- serve to predict the SES of the child at the same age?
The fact of social mobility is closely tied to facts about social inequality and facts about social class. In a highly egalitarian society there would be little need for social mobility. And in a society with a fairly persistent class structure there is also relatively little social mobility -- because there is some set of mechanisms that limit entry and exit into the various classes. In the simplest terms, a social class is a sub-population within a society in which parents and their adult children tend to share similar occupations and economic circumstances of life. It is possible for a society to have substantial inequalities but also a substantial degree of social mobility. But there are good sociological reasons to suspect that this is a fairly unstable situation; groups with a significant degree of wealth and power are also likely to be in a position to arrange social institutions in such a way that privilege is transmitted across generations. (Here are several earlier postings on class; post, post, post.)
A crucial question to pose as we think about class and social mobility, is the issue of the social mechanisms through which children are launched into careers and economic positions in society. A pure meritocracy is a society in which specific social mechanisms distinguish between high-achieving and low-achieving individuals, assigning high-achieving individuals to desirable positions in society. A pure plutocracy is a society in which holders of wealth provide advantages to their children, ensuring that their adult children become the wealth-holders of the next generation. A caste system assigns children and young adults to occupations based on their ascriptive status. In each case there are fairly visible social mechanisms through which children from specific social environments are tracked into specific groups of roles in society. The sociological question is how these mechanisms work; in other words, we want to know about the "microfoundations" of the system of economic and social placement across generations.
In a society in which there is substantial equality of opportunity across all social groups, we would expect there to be little or no correlation between the SES of the parent and the child. We might have a very simple theory of the factors that determine an adult's SES in a society with extensive equality of opportunity: the sum total of the individual's talents, personality traits, and motivation strongly influence success in the pursuit of a career. (Chance also plays a role.) If talent is randomly distributed across the population, rich and poor; if all children are exposed to similar opportunities for the development of their talents; and if all walks of life are open to talent without regard to social status -- then we should find a zero correlation between parents' SES and adult child's SES. So, in this simple model, evidence of correlation with SES of parent and child would also be evidence of failures of equality of opportunity.
However, the situation is more complicated. Success in career is probably influenced by factors other than talent: for example, personal values, practical interests, personality qualities like perseverence, and cultural values. And these qualities are plainly influenced by the child's family and neighborhood environment. So if there is such a thing as a "culture of poverty" or a "culture of entrepreneurism", then the social fact of the child's immersion in this culture will be part of the explanation of the child's performance in adulthood -- whatever opportunities were available to the child. (French sociologist Didier Lapeyronnie makes a point along these lines about the segregation of immigrant communities that exists in French society today; post, post.) So this is a fact about family background that is causally relevant to eventual SES and independent of the opportunity structure of the society.
But another relevant fact is the sharply differentiated opportunities that exist for children and young adults from various social groups in many societies, including the United States. How is schooling provided to children across all income groups? What kind and quality of healthcare is available across income and race? To what extent are job opportunities made available to all individuals without regard to status, race, or income? How are urban people treated relative to suburban or rural people when it comes to the availability of important social opportunities? It is plain that there are substantial differences across many societies when it comes to questions like these.
Education is certainly one of the chief mechanisms of social mobility in any society; it involves providing the child and young adult with the tools necessary to translate personal qualities and talents into productive activity. So inequalities in access to education constitute a central barrier to social mobility. (See this earlier post for a discussion of some efforts to assess the impact of higher education on social mobility for disadvantaged people.)
And it seems all too clear that children have very unequal educational opportunities throughout the United States, from pre-school to university. These inequalities correlate with socially significant facts like family income, place of residence, and race; and they correlate in turn with the career paths and eventual SES of the young people who are placed in one or another of these educational settings. Race is a particularly prevalent form of structural inequalities of opportunity in the US; multiple studies have shown how slowly patterns of racial segregation are changing in the cities of the United States (post). And along with segregation comes limitation on opportunities associated with health, education, and employment.
So the findings mentioned above, documenting the relatively limited degree of social mobility that currently exists in the United States by international standards, are understandable when we consider the entrenched structures that exist in our country determining the opportunities available to children and young adults. Race, poverty, and geography conspire to create recurring patterns of low SES across generations of families in the United States. (See an earlier post on Douglas Massey's analysis of the mechanisms of race and inequality in the US.) And limited social mobility is the predictable result.
source:
August 2, 2011
"Greece: the European version of shock doctrine. The dawn of a new obscure era" by Kostas Svolis
All austerity measures forced on Greek people since 2010 constitute a small hors d'oeuvre in relation to the upcoming tsunami of social poverty and squalor that will be served to them as the main course by the capital and the Greek government, the IMF and EU directorate. The percentage of “official” unemployment has surpassed 16%, while the real one is estimated to be more than 20%. The situation is really dramatic for young people, as the percentage of real unemployment concerning this age group reaches 40%, while it is estimated that by the end of 2011 the number of unemployed will surpass 1 million. Workers’ wages are continuously decreasing and it is estimated that between 2010- 2012 total decrease will reach 30%.
Apart from salary and pension cutbacks in the public sector, there is also dramatic salary decrease in the private sector, through the abolition of collective employment agreements (CEAs), the abolition of overtime cost and the application of flexible and precarious work arrangements. It is notable that employers have the right to pay young workers (up to 25 years old) with only 80% of minimum wage. The new insurance legislation both decreases pensions and increases the number of working years required and the age limit for right to pension (40 years of labor, 65 years of age as minimum requirements for full pension rights).
At the same time, changes in the Greek health system are burdening pensioners and workers with bigger cost participation in medicines and hospitalization. Of course, it is unnecessary to stress that the unemployed, socially excluded people and immigrants have no access whatsoever to the public health system.
In addition, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are on the verge of total extinction, especially those in retailing. The percentage of businesses that have closed in the center of Athens has gone up from 17% (August 2010) to 23,4% as we speak. It is estimated that during the interval 2010-2013 approximately 200.000 small enterprises will be closed and the consequent job loss will amount to more than 350.000 (employers’ jobs included).
Additionally, Greece still holds the third place in EU in relation to inflation rates which, in early 2011 were close to 5% (while at the same period the Eurozone rate was 2,2%). Basic survival goods are becoming more and more expensive and the recession rate remains steady in 3,9%. The dramatic increase of direct taxes on basic popular consumption goods, the increase of income tax even on small incomes, together with the interest rate increase for housing loans, are decreasing even more people’s income. There is also the imposition of poll tax on the self-employed as well as precarious workers who are being paid through rendered services invoice. On the other hand, people who enjoy excessive incomes, the local capital and multinational companies continue to ostentatiously evade taxation and are owing huge sums to national insurance funds. The tax reform that takes place in the name of “investment” generates tax cuts for capitalists and initiates an unprecedented tax raid aiming at small and medium incomes. Nevertheless, it is estimated that there are 600 billion euros worth of deposits by Greek big depositors in Swiss banks, a sum which is twice the amount of the Greek public debt!
By voting the mid-term austerity plan and its application law, the Greek government is preparing to pass to the second phase of its plan that involves selling out the country’s public wealth and taking apart the almost nonexistent welfare state. The most tragic sequences will derive from dissolving the national public health system. The aim is to cut back health expenses by 75 million euros till the end of 2012 and another 150 million euros from 2012 till 2015. Needless to say that this “money saving” procedure will not be based on fighting off health equipment and medicine overcharging, neither bribing and corruption that characterizes the deals between hospital management and pharmaceuticals companies, nor through cutting back the huge salaries of various hospital managers, but on the expense of Greek people’s health. Health expenses cutbacks will take place by decreasing the number of public hospitals from 137 to 83, the number of available hospital beds from 36.000 to 32.000 and the release of 550 of them to private insurance companies for economic exploitation. Clinics inside the remaining hospitals are expected to merge, a fact that will lead in significant reduction of service quality offered by hospitals. It is estimated that in years coming 9.000 doctors will be fired and 26.000 nursing staff. Especially in the case of Greek periphery, there will be a desertification in terms of public health services.
And while the Greek government spent 80 million euros for the Special Olympics Games fiesta, at the same time it discontinues a number of special education schools, thus leading thousands of people with special needs to social exclusion and dramatically increasing their expenses in terms of necessary equipment.
Similar changes are promoted in the education system through school merging that, especially in the case of Greek periphery will lead to exclusion of children even from primary education. As far as tertiary education is concerned, academic independence and self-governance are being abolished, while universities are being forced to operate under private financing criteria and the supervision by managers unfamiliar with their academic and scientific content. The quality of studies is undermined and through cutbacks in catering and housing student rights, as well as access to free books, the road to tuition fees is slowly being paved.
And while the Greek public telecommunications operator has been completely sold out to Germans, the government is preparing to sell out all the other public wealth “fillets”. First and foremost energy and water, the exploitation of mineral ores, beaches, public land for touristic exploitation and everything else imaginable –rumor has it, even archaeological sites. By using fast track laws and the Fund for the Private Property Exploitation of the Public Sector S.A., the Greek government is able to continue its destructive task, without being obstructed by constitutional law, parliamentary procedures, environmental effects studies and whatever might suspend capitalist profitability hidden under the beautified title “investments’. Investors, local and foreign, are the ones that brought Greece to its current state and now they will be able to make huge profits by buying for nothing the country’s public wealth with minimum cost and risk involved.
The cost for society will have many aspects, not just in terms of public revenue loss and the increase of public deficit or bills becoming more expensive and services/goods provided becoming worse due to privatization. Worst of all, exploitation will take place in predatory terms so that the capital will ensure the biggest possible profitability, a fact that will lead in overexploiting natural resources, environmental destruction and pollution increase, thus undermining any future possibility for the society to satisfy its needs through its relationship with nature and the environment.
It is most characteristic that following the privatization of water supply companies in the UK, the budget for repairing networks was diminished to more than 50%, leading to a dramatic increase of leaks. Prices were increased by 36% within a decade, while investors’ profits increased by 14,7% within eight years. Two million people had delinquent accounts, water supply was cut off in more than 18.500 households and 50.000 jobs were lost.
Therefore, through the continuously diminishing work income and rights, the shrinkage of small property and self-employment, the pillage of public wealth and nature, Greek society will acquire specific characteristics noticeable in some South-American societies. The economic polarization between extreme wealth and popular poverty will lead to the rapture of social fabric and to generalized social cannibalism.
The “economic miracle” that took place during the former two decades and led Greece to the European Monetary Union and the Euro, was largely based on non-standard work by hundreds of thousands of immigrants who worked under miserable conditions, on illegal status and with extremely low pay. That “miracle” had as its symbol the Olympic Games 2004, which apart from the huge debt they left behind, they also left numerous dead bodies of immigrant workers (during the construction period of Olympic projects, fatal accidents were estimated to three per week).
Currently, with the crisis plaguing the country, the immigrant population that lifted the burden of economic development by working in the hardest and most underpaid jobs (construction, land workers, housekeeping, sea workers, etc.) are being turned into the first victims not only of unemployment, but of social cannibalism as well. The state exploits both the rhetoric and the racist attacks of right-wind radical and fascist gangs against immigrants in order to channel people’s indignation to a generalized war between different segments of the lower classes. This war takes the form of everyone against everyone, so that the indignation will not transform to an overthrowing force directed to upper and ruling classes.
The above described scenery is complimented by Greece’s transformation to a levee against immigration to the rest of Europe, a role that was imposed by the Dublin II Treaty. Thousands of immigrants who intend to go to other European countries are being trapped in Greece, while there are no existing structures for hospitality and social integration whatsoever and absolutely no working perspective that would ensure some sort of basic living. All these people are stacked in already degraded –due to lack of state interest and the desertification caused by crisis- neighborhoods in Athens and other big cities, trying to survive or creating makeshift camps outside the ports-exits to Europe in Patras and Igoumenitsa, hoping that they will be able to escape hidden in the wheels of a big truck, preferring to risk their lives rather than to live in misery and poverty.
Thus, a grim condition is being created in which crime rate, drugs, prostitution, gang war and, of course, even more upgraded, the serpent’s egg, fascist violence and police repression will be used by rulers in the context of the exertion of biopolitics control over different population segments, locals and immigrants, which will be thrown out of the social fabric because of the crisis. In reality this condition constitutes an opportunity -based on popular demand for safety and security- for reconstructing the legalization of the political system which has reached its lowest point. All this may seem too much for Greek reality at the moment, but it should not be treated as a sci-fi scenario, as it is all about “management” forms that are applied in other countries, such as Mexico. Another way of “managing” crisis could be Greece’s involvement in “issues and adventures of national importance”, using, for example, as a pretext the exploitation of deposits in the Aegean Sea or the wider area of Eastern Mediterranean as well as redefining the country’s foreign policy towards Israel. In this last case, the Greek government’s stance towards the Free Gaza flotilla and its obstruction was most characteristic.
Apart from salary and pension cutbacks in the public sector, there is also dramatic salary decrease in the private sector, through the abolition of collective employment agreements (CEAs), the abolition of overtime cost and the application of flexible and precarious work arrangements. It is notable that employers have the right to pay young workers (up to 25 years old) with only 80% of minimum wage. The new insurance legislation both decreases pensions and increases the number of working years required and the age limit for right to pension (40 years of labor, 65 years of age as minimum requirements for full pension rights).
At the same time, changes in the Greek health system are burdening pensioners and workers with bigger cost participation in medicines and hospitalization. Of course, it is unnecessary to stress that the unemployed, socially excluded people and immigrants have no access whatsoever to the public health system.
In addition, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are on the verge of total extinction, especially those in retailing. The percentage of businesses that have closed in the center of Athens has gone up from 17% (August 2010) to 23,4% as we speak. It is estimated that during the interval 2010-2013 approximately 200.000 small enterprises will be closed and the consequent job loss will amount to more than 350.000 (employers’ jobs included).
Additionally, Greece still holds the third place in EU in relation to inflation rates which, in early 2011 were close to 5% (while at the same period the Eurozone rate was 2,2%). Basic survival goods are becoming more and more expensive and the recession rate remains steady in 3,9%. The dramatic increase of direct taxes on basic popular consumption goods, the increase of income tax even on small incomes, together with the interest rate increase for housing loans, are decreasing even more people’s income. There is also the imposition of poll tax on the self-employed as well as precarious workers who are being paid through rendered services invoice. On the other hand, people who enjoy excessive incomes, the local capital and multinational companies continue to ostentatiously evade taxation and are owing huge sums to national insurance funds. The tax reform that takes place in the name of “investment” generates tax cuts for capitalists and initiates an unprecedented tax raid aiming at small and medium incomes. Nevertheless, it is estimated that there are 600 billion euros worth of deposits by Greek big depositors in Swiss banks, a sum which is twice the amount of the Greek public debt!
By voting the mid-term austerity plan and its application law, the Greek government is preparing to pass to the second phase of its plan that involves selling out the country’s public wealth and taking apart the almost nonexistent welfare state. The most tragic sequences will derive from dissolving the national public health system. The aim is to cut back health expenses by 75 million euros till the end of 2012 and another 150 million euros from 2012 till 2015. Needless to say that this “money saving” procedure will not be based on fighting off health equipment and medicine overcharging, neither bribing and corruption that characterizes the deals between hospital management and pharmaceuticals companies, nor through cutting back the huge salaries of various hospital managers, but on the expense of Greek people’s health. Health expenses cutbacks will take place by decreasing the number of public hospitals from 137 to 83, the number of available hospital beds from 36.000 to 32.000 and the release of 550 of them to private insurance companies for economic exploitation. Clinics inside the remaining hospitals are expected to merge, a fact that will lead in significant reduction of service quality offered by hospitals. It is estimated that in years coming 9.000 doctors will be fired and 26.000 nursing staff. Especially in the case of Greek periphery, there will be a desertification in terms of public health services.
And while the Greek government spent 80 million euros for the Special Olympics Games fiesta, at the same time it discontinues a number of special education schools, thus leading thousands of people with special needs to social exclusion and dramatically increasing their expenses in terms of necessary equipment.
Similar changes are promoted in the education system through school merging that, especially in the case of Greek periphery will lead to exclusion of children even from primary education. As far as tertiary education is concerned, academic independence and self-governance are being abolished, while universities are being forced to operate under private financing criteria and the supervision by managers unfamiliar with their academic and scientific content. The quality of studies is undermined and through cutbacks in catering and housing student rights, as well as access to free books, the road to tuition fees is slowly being paved.
And while the Greek public telecommunications operator has been completely sold out to Germans, the government is preparing to sell out all the other public wealth “fillets”. First and foremost energy and water, the exploitation of mineral ores, beaches, public land for touristic exploitation and everything else imaginable –rumor has it, even archaeological sites. By using fast track laws and the Fund for the Private Property Exploitation of the Public Sector S.A., the Greek government is able to continue its destructive task, without being obstructed by constitutional law, parliamentary procedures, environmental effects studies and whatever might suspend capitalist profitability hidden under the beautified title “investments’. Investors, local and foreign, are the ones that brought Greece to its current state and now they will be able to make huge profits by buying for nothing the country’s public wealth with minimum cost and risk involved.
The cost for society will have many aspects, not just in terms of public revenue loss and the increase of public deficit or bills becoming more expensive and services/goods provided becoming worse due to privatization. Worst of all, exploitation will take place in predatory terms so that the capital will ensure the biggest possible profitability, a fact that will lead in overexploiting natural resources, environmental destruction and pollution increase, thus undermining any future possibility for the society to satisfy its needs through its relationship with nature and the environment.
It is most characteristic that following the privatization of water supply companies in the UK, the budget for repairing networks was diminished to more than 50%, leading to a dramatic increase of leaks. Prices were increased by 36% within a decade, while investors’ profits increased by 14,7% within eight years. Two million people had delinquent accounts, water supply was cut off in more than 18.500 households and 50.000 jobs were lost.
Therefore, through the continuously diminishing work income and rights, the shrinkage of small property and self-employment, the pillage of public wealth and nature, Greek society will acquire specific characteristics noticeable in some South-American societies. The economic polarization between extreme wealth and popular poverty will lead to the rapture of social fabric and to generalized social cannibalism.
The “economic miracle” that took place during the former two decades and led Greece to the European Monetary Union and the Euro, was largely based on non-standard work by hundreds of thousands of immigrants who worked under miserable conditions, on illegal status and with extremely low pay. That “miracle” had as its symbol the Olympic Games 2004, which apart from the huge debt they left behind, they also left numerous dead bodies of immigrant workers (during the construction period of Olympic projects, fatal accidents were estimated to three per week).
Currently, with the crisis plaguing the country, the immigrant population that lifted the burden of economic development by working in the hardest and most underpaid jobs (construction, land workers, housekeeping, sea workers, etc.) are being turned into the first victims not only of unemployment, but of social cannibalism as well. The state exploits both the rhetoric and the racist attacks of right-wind radical and fascist gangs against immigrants in order to channel people’s indignation to a generalized war between different segments of the lower classes. This war takes the form of everyone against everyone, so that the indignation will not transform to an overthrowing force directed to upper and ruling classes.
The above described scenery is complimented by Greece’s transformation to a levee against immigration to the rest of Europe, a role that was imposed by the Dublin II Treaty. Thousands of immigrants who intend to go to other European countries are being trapped in Greece, while there are no existing structures for hospitality and social integration whatsoever and absolutely no working perspective that would ensure some sort of basic living. All these people are stacked in already degraded –due to lack of state interest and the desertification caused by crisis- neighborhoods in Athens and other big cities, trying to survive or creating makeshift camps outside the ports-exits to Europe in Patras and Igoumenitsa, hoping that they will be able to escape hidden in the wheels of a big truck, preferring to risk their lives rather than to live in misery and poverty.
Thus, a grim condition is being created in which crime rate, drugs, prostitution, gang war and, of course, even more upgraded, the serpent’s egg, fascist violence and police repression will be used by rulers in the context of the exertion of biopolitics control over different population segments, locals and immigrants, which will be thrown out of the social fabric because of the crisis. In reality this condition constitutes an opportunity -based on popular demand for safety and security- for reconstructing the legalization of the political system which has reached its lowest point. All this may seem too much for Greek reality at the moment, but it should not be treated as a sci-fi scenario, as it is all about “management” forms that are applied in other countries, such as Mexico. Another way of “managing” crisis could be Greece’s involvement in “issues and adventures of national importance”, using, for example, as a pretext the exploitation of deposits in the Aegean Sea or the wider area of Eastern Mediterranean as well as redefining the country’s foreign policy towards Israel. In this last case, the Greek government’s stance towards the Free Gaza flotilla and its obstruction was most characteristic.
A de-legalized political system
At this moment the political system seems too weak to activate this sort of control mechanisms and appears to concentrate all its powers in trying to apply the three pillars of the economic steamroller that were mentioned before.According to the latest poll, which in essence validates previous ones, unspecified vote amounts to 35%, the percentages of the two major political parties are between 27-25% with neither of the two having majority, while the conservative opposition is pulling ahead of the socialist governing party, and 49,6% of participants approve of public demonstrations against MPs that voted for the memorandum and constitute a part of the daily political agenda in Greece. Left-wing parties do not seem able to effectively reap the centrifugal tendencies of the electorate and their shortcoming appears as structural as the crisis characterizing the rest of the political system.
Papandreou’s government –that nearly abdicated when it dealt with popular anger during the general strike and the Parliament blockage on June 15th- is in quick sand. This is not due solely to the fact that 5 of its MPs have gone independent since the government was sworn, nor to its downfall as sketched by poll results. The basic problem is that the government ruptures its representation relations with its popular basis and even its hard core who are the workers in public and wider public sector and who ensured PASOK’s majority in labor unions, without at the same time being able to build new alliances with other social classes. PASOK’s government remains in power only because of the strong pressure it takes from its principals abroad and the support it enjoys from local capitalists who control the media. In spite of the centrifugal tendencies characterizing the governing party, there are still no reliable socialdemocratic alternatives in Greece.
The important question arising is until when PASOK will be able to govern and suffer the political cost and if PASOK will exist, in which form and with what kind of electoral strength after the elections, whenever and if they take place.
Nevertheless, the most important issue is what kind of processes and dynamic are going to develop in its social base which, on one hand detaches itself from party representation, but on the other remains silent and inert.
The conservative opposition party, New Democracy (ND) may have voted against the mid-term austerity plan but has also voted for the majority of the articles of its application law, thus trying both to comply with the anti-memorandum feelings of its voters and the demand of European partners for political consensus as far as the austerity measures are concerned. Nevertheless this effort was in vain, as both voters and partners are displeased! Given the fact that is impossible for ND to consent to a coalition with its eternal adversary, PASOK, without facing tremendous political cost, ND is forced to demand elections though in secret it wishes against majority -which is unlikeable, anyway.
The political forces of the “willing” span the entire spectrum of the political system, ranging from right-wing radicals (LAOS) and hardcore right-wing liberals (DE.SY.) to the most reformist version of the Left (DE.AR.) and they constitute the political system’s reserve in the very likely case that PASOK will not be able to cope with tasks assigned. The possibility of a coalition or a national consensus is very strong, whether it comes up as an election result or not. There are lot of jokers (polls predict a 9-party parliament) and as a result, alternatives multiply. It goes without saying that a government of this type, especially in the name of national unity, will impose even harder measures and will not hesitate to rely even more on brute force exercised by suppressive mechanisms.
The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) remains faithful to a policy of isolationism and entrenchment, not only in relation to other political formations of the Left, but also to all kinematic processes and fermentation that are taking place in squares. Its strategy concentrates exclusively in increasing its electoral percentage. In spite of its revolutionary rhetoric, it does not miss the opportunity to wink at bourgeois legitimacy, thus being rewarded by the media as the serious, responsible, fortified Left. Even when, on some occasion (seamen strike, for example) it hardens its attitude, it does not provide the struggle with perspective and continuity. As the oldest in the Greek political scene, the Communist Party is more interested in its reproduction, rather than its potential role as a catalyst in the context of a subversive movement –a stance characteristic of any bureaucracy.
Apart from wading in the muddy waters of the squares’ movement, SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) remains captive not only of its internal contradictions and juxtapositions, but mostly of a policy that although it may seem kinematic, it seeks ways to rescue and not to surpass the existing system. SYRIZA may be under continuous attack by the media for supposedly being politically responsible for public citizen protests and the “violence” against government officials (for several months now government officials and PASOK MPs are unable to circulate in public without being subjected to citizens protesting against them), but at the same time SYRIZA’s sole proposal for finding a way out of the crisis is a regulatory plan for the economic capital, debt renegotiation and development measures, without making any kind of groundbreaking proposal towards socially redefining productive activity.
It is notable that, for the first time, social and political polarization as well as the disparate questioning of the political system are recorded in polls, by estimating an electoral percentage of 1,5-2% for radical left ANTARSYA and 1-1,5% for neo-Nazi HRYSI AVGI.
Is there a rival?
Nonetheless, opposite of this nightmarish scenery there appears popular dispute and disobedience, chaotic, confused, mixed up, controversial, contradictory –but apparent. The question is whether dispute and disobedience will transform to a considerable rival.The eight 24hour general strikes that took place since the Greek government has asked for an IMF-EU bailout and the 48hour strike in June, exhibit a considerable social dynamic which, without question, is not based on decadent and disreputable tertiary trade union bodies. GSEE (General Confederation of Greek Workers) and ADEDY (Civil Servants' Confederation) mainly consist of public and wider public sector workers, since trade union density in the private sector does not exceed 10%. In reality, GSEE and ADEDY can do nothing else than declaring some general strikes, under the continuing pressure of labor classes. They have been completely cut off from trade unionist workers and they are unable to organize any sort of serious proletarian struggle. Even in the case where significant public industries were targeted for privatization and went on long-term strikes (public transport, DEI-Public Power Corporation, etc), trade union leaders functioned as hindrance to any form of struggle and caused its degeneration. It is most characteristic that the latest 48hour strike was organized under the pressure of Syntagma Square mobilizations and so as to avoid the risk for GSEE and ADEDY to lose even the last ounce of their prestige.
On the other hand, during the last few years a number of militant primary trade unions have been created, mainly after the initiative of fighters of the extraparliamentary Left and the Anarchist movement. These primary trade unions mainly concern non-standard workers in the private sector such as: couriers, waitpersons, call center employees, bookshop employees, teaching staff, technical employees, etc. The main characteristics of primary trade unions are intense militant action, anti-hierarchical structure and a clear anticapitalist politicization in contrast with the partisan influence characterizing bureaucratic syndicates. Primary trade unions are quite small and it could be said that they constitute raw syndicate models; nevertheless they are very successful in terms of achieving significant results. They fight against layoffs, for the application of trade collective agreements and for acquiring more working rights such as benefits for different specialties, etc. Their power lies in the fact that when fighting against employers (where their main weapon apart from striking is also business boycotting), they succeed in mobilizing significant numbers of supporters in solidarity with their cause from the wider anticapitalist movement. In addition, the extra-parliamentary Left is relatively powerful amongst educators, hospital doctors, Local Management Organizations (OTA), Ministry of Culture employees, etc. Nevertheless, their action nowadays finds serious obstacles, having on one hand to deal with the abolition of negotiations for CEAs that was voted by government and on the other hand a huge wave of layoffs which, in combination with increasing unemployment numbers, makes the struggle for re-hiring extremely difficult.
It would be impossible to leave out other notable forms of social struggle, which through time acquire a more radical character. Most characteristic examples are the struggle of the 300 worker immigrants concerning permits and the one fought by Keratea residents against landfill construction in their area. These are struggles organized by the people and in many cases acquire a conflictual character and are characterized by an intense tendency to question central authority and its decisions.
The existence of radical Left organizations, but mainly organizations of a wider anticapitalist movement with distinctive Autonomous, Antiauthoritarian and Anarchist characteristics constitutes for certain a big draw for social questioning, in spite of the existing huge problems and contradictions, mainly those of sectarianism in the case of radical Left and the fetishization of colliding with riot police in the case of Anarchists. If, supposedly, December 2008 was a youthful insurrection where the wider Anticapitalist and Anarchist movement put its stamp, it is time to outdistance itself and its own “regularity”, starting first of all to broaden its social reference beyond young people. Surely there will be plenty of opportunity to make that leap shortly, either through the processes which begun at Syntagma Square, or the local and partial struggles as well as resisting the privatization of public wealth.
The contribution of the wider Anticapitalist movement, not only in the forthcoming working and social struggles, but also in the forms and structures of social solidarity and reproduction, so that society will be able to hold its ground in times of social poverty, will be of major importance not only for society itself, but for the political existence of the Anticapitalist movement as well. Defending and broadening the social character of public goods and resources which the government intends to sell out, reconstituting parts of the productive sector for catering to social needs apart from market criteria, are all issues that must be included in our daily agenda under a different prism that will combine mediate answers with strategic perspective. In reality we are falling behind, social solidarity structures are fetal and experimental, functioning in the context of political collectives, while the attempts to create productive collectives are nonexistent.
All issues are wide open in front of our eyes, but one way or the other the shadow of the future has fallen upon us…
Kostas Svolis
published at Anarkismo.net : http://www.anarkismo.net/article/20210
December 7, 2010
Crisis In The Class Relation // by Endnotes
Endnotes #2 April 2010 / Misery and the value form
The history of capitalist society is the history of the reproduction of the capitalist class relation. It is that of the reproduction of capital as capital, and — its necessary concomitant — of the working class as working class. If we assume the reproduction of this relation is not inevitable, what is the possibility of its non-reproduction?
For a brief moment the recent crisis perhaps seemed to present us with a glimpse of such non-reproduction: the phenomenon of bank runs returned to the capitalist core, a wave of fuel and food price riots swept numerous countries, stock markets slid and corporations filed for bankruptcy, the Icelandic economy collapsed, the world as a whole entered a crisis widely announced as the worst since the Great Depression, Greece was lit up with insurrection, and forms of class struggle that have not been seen for decades reappeared in the UK. For a few months empty words were thrown around about a return of Marx and mainstream economists became catastrophists, before talk of “green shoots” returned and the usual idea began to set in that this crisis was, at most, a particularly severe glitch in the normal functioning of the capitalist economy, caused by some arbitrary, non-systemic factor. In such a situation, rather than a posing of the possible non-reproduction of the capitalist class relation, it is perhaps more plausible to interpret crisis as an aspect of the self-regulation of the capitalist world economy; at most a particularly extreme “shake-out” of some excesses or irrationalities in an otherwise healthy, fully functional system.
But there is no healthy equilibrium state, no “normal”, fully functional condition at the core of capitalist society. Crisis is the modus vivendi of the capitalist class relation, the life-process of this contradiction. Insofar as the accumulation of capital is always a fraught, problematic process; insofar as, even in its victories over the proletariat, capital still approaches impasses of over-accumulation; insofar as the dance of the capitalist class relation cannot take place without both of its reluctant partners, crisis is always here. In the capitalist mode of production labour is the source of value, yet with the progress of accumulation necessary labour is a tendentially diminishing magnitude. Crisis is always with us because, for capital, labour is a problem.
Yet crisis is also a discrete event. The spectacular catastrophism that reigned in global stock markets around the fall of Lehman Brothers, the waves of mortgage foreclosures sweeping the US, the looming bankruptcy of entire states, the vast bailouts and forecasts of depression, the hailing of an end of the “neoliberal” era and the appearance — no matter how illusory — of ideas of a return to Keynes: all of these are the very real signs of a particular crisis in the capitalist class relation. The particular crisis betrays the general contradiction of this relation, as if suddenly the lid had been blown off of the machine, and all the crunching gears exposed. Like all crises, this represents the deeper shifting structure of the class relation: where an aspect of the reproduction of the relation runs up against its limits, a moment of systemic openness and a fleeting glimpse of the possibility of rupture appears. Then, where one gear had slipped from the flywheel, through some chaotic mechanics another re-engages at a now-altered momentum. The contradictory reproduction of the capitalist class relation continues for now, with some modifications; Chance the gardener’s “green shoots” announce the end of winter, and crisis is naturalised once again not as chronic or permanent condition, but as the eternal recurrence of a natural cycle.
What is the character of the reproduction of the class relation now, and how is it transforming itself? What intimations can we find in this of the possibility of its non-reproduction? What — that is to say — is the possibility now of a complete rupture with this self-reproduction? These are the questions to which a revolutionary theory must address itself. It is in the changing modalities of this reproduction that we can grasp the real history of capitalist society as something more than a contingent assemblage of facts, narratives or concepts, strategic victories, defeats or recuperations, because it is in its self-reproduction that the capitalist class relation constructs itself as a totality. For the same reason, it is in these modalities that we must look for the possibilities of an immanent destruction of that totality.
we invite you to read all article here:
http://endnotes.org.uk/articles/2
we invite you to read all article here:
http://endnotes.org.uk/articles/2
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